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The California Coastal Commission
and Regulatory Takings
WARD TABOR*
One of the principle concerns behind adoption of the California
Coastal Act of 1976' was enhancement of public access to coastal
shorelines.2 Californians have a constitutional right of access to
navigable waters of the state.3 The California and the United States
Constitutions, however, provide that private property may not be taken
for public use without the payment of just compensation." Determin-
ing when a regulatory provision for access is a compensable taking
has been a difficult task. The matter is not yet completely resolved.
The state legislature authorized the California Coastal Commission
(hereafter Commission) to carry out California's constitutional mandate
of public access to waters of the state.' From the beginning of its
work, the Commission has vigorously enforced its mandate. Indeed,
the Commission has been accused of regulating the coastline beyond
* Attorney, General Litigation Section, Land and Natural Resources Division, United
States Department of Justice, J.D. McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, 1985.
M.S., Microbiology San Diego State University, 1978. B.A., Biology, University of California,
San Diego, 1975.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and should not be attributed to the
Land and Natural Resources Division of the Uaited States Department of Justice.
1. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§30000-30900.
2. Id. §§30210, 30212, 30214.
3. Cal. Const. art. X, §4; see also CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §30210.
4. CAL. Co sT. art. I, §19; U.S. CoNsT. AMEND. V.
5. CAL. PUB. Rs. CODE §§30210-30900. At the end of 1984 there were 1,817 permits
issued with access conditions. California Coastal Commission and California Coastal Conser-
vancy, Coastal Access Program Fifth Annual Report, at 8 (1985).
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all standards of rationality.6 Among the reported abuses is the case
of Robert and Caroline Bailey who were told by the Commission to
give to the state the entire beach area of their property.7 During the
winter of 1978, high winds, unusually high tides, and strong waves
were threatening to undermine and erode the sand from under the
Bailey's house and the houses of their neighbors.' The Baileys and
their neighbors employed a contractor to place rocks directly in front
of their homes. After having survived the storm, the Baileys were
informed that they had acted illegally by installing the rocks without
a county and a coastal development permit. They applied for a per-
mit and went through five months of administrative procedures. The
Baileys then were told that they could obtain a permit but only on
the condition that they give up their privately owned beach area. At
no time had they prevented the public from using the beach area.
Such administrative abuse9 triggers the constitutional proscription
against taking private property for public use without just compensa-
tion."0 A "taking" may arise from restricting the use of property as
well as taking title."1 The right to exclude others from one's private
property is a fundamental element of ownership, one of the "sticks
within the bundle of rights" that we label property.' 2 This right falls
within the category of interests that the government cannot take
without compensation.' 3
If property is taken by excessive regulation, the property owner's
usual remedy is an action entitled "inverse condemnation," whereby
the owner sues the government and seeks an award of just compen-
sation for the injuries and damages sustained.' The California Supreme
Court has denied the existence of an inverse condemnation cause of
action when the government acts pursuant to land-use-regulation police
6. J. GucamsEmrr & E.D. WHEELER, THE TAKING 48 (1982).
7. Id. at 58.
8. Id. at 58-9.
9. This is only one of many reported alleged abuses of private property rights by the
Commission. See GUGHEMETrTI & WHEELER, supra note 6, at 48-69.
10. When the government over-regulates property through its police power, such regula-
tion may be a taking within the meaning of the fifth amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178 (1979). The "just compensation" clause
of the fifth amendment is binding not only on the Federal Government, but applies to the
states through the "due process" clause of the fourteenth amendment. Chicago, Burlington
and Quincy R.R. Co., 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1896).
11. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 80, 96 (1931);
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174 n.8 (1979).
12. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179-80.
13. Id.
14. J. GUGHEMETTI AND E. D. WHEELER, supra note 6 at 122.
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power authority." The precise issue has not yet been authoritatively
decided by the United States Supreme Court. 6
This article explores the question of when the California Coastal
Commission may require the dedication of an easement as a condi-
tion to a permit for development without thereby invoking the "just
compensation" and "due process" clauses of the California and United
States Constitutions. Initially, the focus will be on the relationship
between the California Constitution and statutes and the administrative
practices of the Commission regarding access to the coastline. Second,
the pertinent doctrines of California statutory and common law dedica-
tion of private property for public use will be analyzed. The third
section will deal with case law of the United States Supreme Court
on regulatory takings and the Constitution. The need for just com-
pensation will be analyzed by applying Supreme Court precedents to
facts arising under the Coastal Act.
Easement dedication conditions applied to large scale project
developers will be shown to be constitutional because of the potential
impact such developers have on the coastal resources of the state.
Under other circumstances, however, the easement dedication re-
quirements used by the Commission may amount to taking of private
property for public use for which the California and the United States
Constitutions require just compensation.
CALIFORNIA COASTAL ACT
The California Coastal Act of 1976' was enacted as the coastal
zone management program of the state required to satisfy the Federal
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972.18 Among the basic goals of
the California Coastal Act are to:
(c) Maximize public access to and along the coast rand maximize
public recreational opportunities in the coastal zone consistent with
sound resources conservation principles and constitutionally protected
rights of private property owners."
15. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr.
372 (1979), aff'd 447 U.S. 255 (1980). The state court said the only remedy is to declare the
restriction invalid. Agins, 24 Cal.3d at 276-77, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 372, 598 P.2d at 25.
16. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 225 (1980); San Diego Gas & Electric
v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
17. CAL. PUa. RFs. CODE §§30000-30900.
18. 16 U.S.C. §§1451-1464. The federal program called for the planning and management
of coastal resources. Id.
19. CAL. PUB. Ras. CODE §30001.5(c).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 17
The legislature specifically declared that the Coastal Act "is not
intended and shall not be construed as authorizing" state or local
governments to exercise their authority, pursuant to the Act, to grant
or deny a permit in a manner which will "take or damage private
property for public use, without the payment of just compensation."'"
A. Development Control Provisions of the Coastal Act
Any person wishing to perform or undertake any development in
the coastal zone, with certain limited exceptions,2 must obtain a coastal
development permit.22 The permit program is administered by the
California Coastal Commission23 or a local government that has
established approved procedures for its local coastal program.2 A
coastal development permit will be issued only if the issuing local
agency, or the Commission on appeal, finds that the proposed develop-
ment is in conformity with the certified local coastal program." Every
coastal development permit issued for any development between the
shoreline of any body of water within the coastal zone and the nearest
public road must include a specific finding that such development
is in conformity with the public access and public recreation policies26
of the Act. 27
Any permit issued or any development or action approved on appeal
is subject to reasonable terms and conditions to ensure that the develop-
ment is in accord with the Act.2" The Coastal Act provides for
exemptions to permit requirements.29 One who seeks to develop under
such conditions, however, must seek a certification of exemption from
the administering agency.3" Some of these permit "exemptions" will
be discussed below.
20. Id. §30010. This provision further states: "This section is not intended to increase
or decrease the right of any owner of property under the Constitution of the State of Califor-
nia or the United States." Id. These provisions essentially are restatements of property protec-
tion doctrines embodied in state and federal constitutions.
21. See id. §25500. Energy related facilities are regulated by the Energy Commission. See
id. §§25000 et seq.
22. Id. §30600.
23. Id.
24. Id. §30600. The Coastal Act was initially administered by the Commission and six
regional commissions. See e.g. Georgia-Pacific v. California Coastal Commission, 132 Cal. App.3d
678, 686, 183 Cal. Rptr. 295 (1982). The regional commissions were abolished as local govern-
ments in the coastal zone prepared approved local coastal plans. See id. §§30500 et seq.
25. Id. §30604(b).
26. Id. §30200-30265.5.
27. Id. §30604(c).
28. Id. §30607.
29. Id. §30610-30611.
30. Id. §30610.2.
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B. Public Access Provisions of the Coastal Act
The public access provisions of the Coastal Act3' were intended
to carry out Section 4 of Article X of the California Constitution. 2
The constitutional provision relates to the public's right of access to
navigable waters of the state and provides:
No individual, partnership, or corporation, claiming or possess-
ing the frontage or tidal lands of a harbor, bay, inlet, estuary, or
other navigable water of this State, shall be permitted to exclude
the right of way to such water whenever it is required for any public
purpose, nor to destroy or obstruct the free navigation of such water;
and the Legislature shall enact such laws as will give the most liberal
construction to this provision, so that access to the navigable waters
of this State shall be always attainable for the people thereof. 33
The Act provides that maximum access and recreation opportunities
should be provided, consistent with public safety needs, the need to
protect public and private property rights, and the need to protect
natural resource areas from overuse.3 Also, developments should not
interfere with the public's right of access to the sea, when that right
has been acquired through use35 or through legislative authorization. 6
In addition, the Public Resources Code provides that public access
to the shoreline from the nearest public road and along the coast
should be provided in new development projects, with certain excep-
tions .
31. Id. §30210-30214.
32. Id. §30210.
33. CAL. CONST. art. X, §4 (section renumbered June 8, 1976, originally adopted 1879).
34. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §30210. The legislature has provided for exemptions to these
access requirements for certain types of developments. Id. §30212(a). They include (1) replace-
ment of certain structures; (2) improvements that do not substantially increase the size or sur-
face area, and which do not impede public access and do not amount to a seaward encroach-
ment; (3) the reconstruction of any seawall that is not seaward of the former structure; and
(4) any repair or maintenance activity for which the Commission has determined that a coastal
development permit will be required. Id. §§30212, 30610 (emphasis added). This last exception,
however, does not apply when the Commission has determined that a particular repair or
maintenance activity will have an adverse impact on lateral public access along that beach.
Id. §30212(b)(5). The legislature provided for various factors to be taken into account in im-
plementing the public access policies of the Coastal Act. Id. §30214. Among these are (1) the
geologic and topographic characteristics (2) the capacity of the site to sustain use (3) the
appropriateness of limiting access due to fragility of the natural resources and the proximity
to adjacent residential areas (4) the need to protect the privacy of adjacent land owners and
(5) the management needs for protection of aesthetic values (i.e., collection of litter). Id.
35. Id. §30211. This, apparently, is a reference to the rights of the public acquired through
the doctrine of implied dedication. See infra notes 120-125 and accompanying text (a discus-
sion of this doctrine).
36. Id. §30211. Legislative authorization would probably include any statutory provisions
that would allow the government to require dedications as a condition to development. See
infra notes 104-117 and accompanying text (discussion of statutory dedication).
37. CAL. PuB. Ras. CODE §30212(a).
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The specific intent of the legislature was that the public access
policies of the California Coastal Act of 1976 be carried out in a
reasonable manner.38 This includes consideration of the equities and
balancing the rights of the individual property owner with the public's
constitutional right of access pursuant to Article X, Section 4 of the
California Constitution.39
A repeated aspect of these access policies is the protection of private
property rights. 40 The statutory language implies that a parity exists
between the strength of the constitutional protection of private prop-
erty and that of the public's right of access to the shoreline. 4' While
the police power permits reasonable conditions upon a landowner's
development proposal, not all conditions are valid." A grant of public
privilege may not be conditioned upon giving up constitutional rights.43
Public access dedication conditions imposed on the grant of a coastal
development permit are valid if reasonably conceived to fulfill public
needs emanating from the property owner's proposed use." The follow-
ing section describes the Commission's interpretation of the public
access provisions of the Act and how they relate to the constitutional
rights of access.
C. Public Access Interpretive Guidelines
As part of its regulatory duties, the Commission was directed to
prepare a set of guidelines explaining its interpretation of the public
access provisions of the Coastal Act. "s The guidelines are the for-
38. Id. §30214(b).
39. Id.
40. Id. §§30010, 30214(a)(3), 30214(a)(4), 30214(b).
41. Id. §§30210, 30214(b).
42. Liberty v. California Coastal Commission, 113 Cal. App.3d 491, 503, 170 Cal. Rptr.
247. 254 (1980).
43. Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 421, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872,
979, (1969). See also Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 270,
625 P.2d 779, 789, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 876 (1981).
44. Liberty at 503, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
45. CAL. Pun. REs. CODE §30620(a)(3). The section provides:
[Tihe commission shall, consistent with the provisions of this chapter, prepare in-
terim procedures for the... review . . . of coastal development permit applications
.. . Such procedures shall include ... (3) Interpretive guidelines designed to assist
local governments, the regional commissions, the commission, and persons subject
to the provisions of this chapter in determining how the policies of this division [the
Coastal Act] shall be applied in the coastal zone prior to certification of local coastal
programs; provided however, that such guidelines shall not supersede, enlarge, or
diminish the powers or authority of any regional commission, the commission, or
any other public agency.
Id.
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mulation of general policy intended to govern future permit decisions. 6
The guidelines do not require the Commission to impose access con-
ditions in any particular circumstance."7 Rather the guidelines claim
to adopt a flexible approach and the Commission is to determine the
appropriateness of access exactions on a case-by-case basis." Never-
theless, the presence of the guidelines may have a tendency to inhibit
property owners from planning improvements on their land because
of the possibility of a requirement for access conditions when an actual
permit is applied for. 9
According to the Commission, public prescriptive rights must be
protected wherever they exist." Action taken by the Commission,
therefore, should not diminish the potential prescriptive rights in any
way.' Evidence of prescriptive use indicates the need for dedication
areas required under Section 30212 of the Act. 52 The conclusion of
the Commission is that all new development which results in any in-
tensification of land use generates sufficient burdens on public access
to require conditions in permits for access dedication."
The guidelines describe two types of access dedications: lateral and
vertical.54 Lateral access allows the public to move freely along all
46. Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Commission, 33 Cal.3d 158, 168, 655
P.2d 306, 312, 188 Cal. Rptr. 104, 111 (1982). The guidelines discuss the policy behind the
statutory provisions on public access. Id. Unregulated coastal development was individually
and cumulatively precluding public access to state-owned tidelands. California Coastal Com-
mission, Statewide Interpretive Guidelines, as amended December 16, 1981, at 12. The Com-
mission, before adoption of the public access statutes, recommended that private development
be regulated to assure that development will not directly or indirectly preclude access to the
shoreline. Id. at 11-13. A troubling aspect of these guidelines is that the Commission has not
complied with procedures required for the adoption of regulations. See CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§11346-11446. (West Supp. 1985). These provisions apply to the exercise of any quasi-legislative
power, unless expressly exempted by statute. Id. §11346. The required procedures include oublica-
tion of notice of proposed rules, id. §11346.4; a hearing on the proposed rule, id. §11346.8;
review by the Office of Administrative Law, id. §11349.8; review by the Office of Administrative
Law, id. § 11349.1. Rules which have not been properly adopted as regulations may be declared
invalid. Id. §11350(a).
47. Pacific Legal Foundation, 33 Cal. 3d at 174, 655 P.2d at 316, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 115.
48. Id. The Commission has discretion in most cases to determine the appropriateness
of access dedication. See generally CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§30212(a), 30214(a).
49. Pacific Legal Foundation, 33 Cal. 3d at 173, 655 P.2d at 315, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 114.
50. Coastal Commission, Statewide Interpretive Guidelines, as amended Dec. 16, 1981,
at I 1 (hereinafter cited as Interpretive Guidelines). See infra note, 120-125 and accompanying
text (discussion of public prescriptive rights).
51. Interpretive Guidelines, supra note 49 at 11.
52. Id. at 12.
53. Id. at 13. Admitting the legislative exceptions to access dedications, the Commission
concludes that they relate to the appropriateness of access itself, rather than the type of develop-
ment. Id.
54. Id. at 14.
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the tidelines."1 The Commission's interpretation specifies a twenty-
five foot area of dry sand beach at all times. 6 This view is based
on what is necessary to allow reasonable use by the public of state-
owned tidelands.57 Vertical access dedications are required to provide
access from thb first public road to the shoreline. 8
The Commission accepts that property owners have privacy rights 9
and generally considers that a ten-foot buffer between the structure
and the accessway is sufficient. 60 The guidelines do not discuss the
other "property" rights of such owners.
Although the language of the statute requires access to be provided
only when access does not exist nearby, the view of the Commission
is that existing access along the shoreline is almost never adequate
to serve the public need, due to the uniqueness of each stretch of
the coastline. 6' Lateral access is generally required along all stretches
of sandy beach.62
D. Case Law Relating to Coastal Public Access
Relatively few reported cases have dealt with the issue of dedica-
tions under the Coastal Act, especially in relation to constitutionality.
The cases can be separated into three groups: (1) seawall cases; (2)
single family home cases; and, (3) large scale development cases. In the
reported case regarding the rebuilding of a seawall, the action arose
from a disagreement between the Commission and the home owner
over the propriety of a permit condition requiring the owner to dedicate
a lateral easement for public access. 63 During the unusually severe
winter storm of 1978, high waves threatened damage to property
owners' residences. The owners improved the existing seawall by ad-
ding rock below the sandy surface." The Commission subsequently
55. Id.
56. Id. In this regard, the Commission has attempted to enlarge the public's constitutional
right of access to navigable waters. See J. J. GuaGaHamri AND E. D. VHEELER, supra note
6 at 48. The constitutional right is to access, not a contiguous 25-foot wide easement. See
CAL. CoNsT. art. X, Section 4.
57. Interpretive Guideline, supra note 49 at 16.
58. Id. at 22. Additionally, the Commission has created on its own the concept of bluff-
top access. Id. at 21. This is to allow public viewing of the shoreline, and its rationale is
found in the need for mitigating a project's otherwise inconsistency with the Act. Id.
59. Id. at 19-21.
60. Id. at 22.
61. Id. at 25.
62. Id.
63. Pacific Legal Foundation, 33 Cal.3d 158, 665 P.2d 306, 188 Cal. Rptr. 104.
64. Id. at 164, 655 P.2d at 309, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 107. The facts of this situation are
strikingly similar to those of the Baileys. See supra notes 8 and 9 and accompanying text.
1986 / Regulatory Takings
notified them that a permit was required for the repair which had
been made. A permit was granted on the condition they dedicate the
entire sandy beach from the mean high tide level to the toe of the
seawall. The trial court invalidated the condition for three reasons:
(1) the seawall had no adverse impact on the supply of sand to the
beach; (2) the seawall did not in any way interfere with the natural
processes of the shoreline; and, (3) there was insufficient evidence
to support the finding of the Commission that the seawall improve-
ment adversely affected public access to or across the beach. 65 The
Commission appealed, but later dismissed the appeal. The case reached
the California Supreme Court on a complicated and, for the purpose
of this discussion, irrelevant issue, i.e., attorneys fees for landowners.66
The second general situation discussed in the case law is that of
the single family home. In Sea Ranch Association v. California Coastal
Commission,67 the plaintiffs alleged that the Coastal Act was un-
constitutional as applied to them in that the Act took their property
for public use without just compensation and denied them due pro-
cess and equal protection. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and in-
junctive relief.68 Permits of individual lot owners were conditioned
upon dedications for public beach access and view easements. The
court granted summary judgment for the Commission, finding that
the public access conditions were valid and within the ambit of the
Commission's regulatory power. 69 The court concluded that the Com-
mission would have violated the Coastal Act if the Commission had
not formulated and imposed the challenged conditions.7" This deci-
sion seems reasonably based upon the stated policies of the Coastal
Act to maximize public access and views. The effect of final buildout
of the Sea Ranch and other similar developments would increase local
population and tourism and therefore would increase the needs for
public access."
In the second case, Grupe v. California Coastal Commission," the
owner of a single-family home lot sought invalidation of an access
65. Pacific Legal Foundation, 33 Cal. 3d at 164, 655 P.2d at 309, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
66. Id. 655 P.2d at 311, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 110. The request for attorneys fees was denied
because rather than protecting a public right under the private attorney general doctrine, the
plaintiffs had protected merely personal rights. Id. at 167, 655 P.2d at 311, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
67. 527 F. Supp 390 (1981), vacated and remanded, 454 U.S. 1070 (1981) (to consider
mootness in light of enactment of PUB. Rrs. CODE §30610.6).
68. Id. at 391.
69. Id. at 395.
70. Id. at 393.
71. Id. at 395.
72. 166 Cal. App.3d 148, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1985).
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condition and damages for violation of federal constitutional rights
under Title 42 U.S.C. section 1983.11 The owner had sought a permit
to build a single-family home. The application was approved subject
to a condition requiring a dedication of an easement for public access
and passive recreational use covering about 9,000 square feet, represen-
ting some two-thirds of the entire lot. The trial court awarded $150,000
damages, but only if the Commission failed to invalidate the condi-
tion on the basis that the condition (1) amounted to a taking of private
property without just compensation; and (2) violated substantive due
process.74
The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that only an indirect rela-
tionship existed between the imposed exaction and the public need
to which the development contributed." As the owner's beach front
home was one more brick in the wall separating the people of Califor-
nia from the tidelands of the state, the project contributed to the
cumulative severe limitation on public access. 76 The court classified
the easement exaction as a "limited economic regulation of the use
of real property imposed for the public welfare," as the easement
was reasonably related to a legitimate public purpose - public access
to state tidelands. 77 Further, the appellate court found no taking
without just compensation. 7" Analogizing to the Subdivision Map Act
cases,79 the court found reciprocal benefits to the landowner in being
permitted to build a home on the coast.80 Therefore, requiring the
homeowner to bear this burden was not unjust.8'
The courts are quite willing to allow the Commission to go rather
far, i.e. taking two-thirds of a lot, without finding any federal con-
stitutional violations. A relationship always exists, however, between
providing access and coastal recreational opportunities and property
which is adjacent to the coastline. That alone should not create con-
stitutional validity. The public right is that of access to navigable
waters,82 not a right to have beach available for passive recreational
use. Clearly, the state could not, absent the development permit system,
73. Id. at 157, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
74. Id. at 159, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
75. Id. at 166, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
76. Id. at 167, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 589-90.
77. Id. at 171, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 592.
78. Id. at 177, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 597.
79. See infra notes 104-117 and accompanying text.
80. Grupe, 166 Cal. App.3d at 175-77, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 595-97.
81. Id. at 177, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 597.
82. CAL. CONST. art. X, sec. 4.
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require a property owner to convey property to the state without just
compensation. Under the guise of the police power, however, the Com-
mission appears to be doing just that.
The final set of cases represent regulation and easement exactions
aimed at large scale developers. The cases are quite distinct, but
demonstrate the extent of the Commission's authority, as well as its
limitations. The first was Liberty v. California Coastal Commission,"
in which the landowner had applied for a permit to construct a
restaurant.8" One of the conditions attached to his permit was to pro-
vide one parking space for every fifty square feet of floor space and
to make the lot available for free public parking every day until 5
p.m. for thirty years.
The court noted, preliminarily, that the proper mechanism for testing
the propriety of the imposition of a permit condition is a writ of
mandamus rather than inverse condemnation.8" The court compared
the free parking condition with that of access to beach or lagoon
areas, stating:
[T]he State Commission may require the dedication of property for
access to or along the coast, and we are not called upon to consider
the propriety of that condition in the subject permit since Liberty
has agreed to it. By contrast, requiring a landowner to provide access
to the beach and lagoon areas over a route to which the public may
have acquired a prescriptive easement (see §30211) differs substan-
tially from requiring the landowner to dedicate land for free public
parking to which the public has no apparent right.86
The court held that the condition for free public parking was
unreasonable and unfair, reasoning that to impose the burden on one
property owner to an extent beyond his own use unfairly shifts the
burden of the government to a private party.8" In other words, police
power is unreasonably exercised when the imposed conditions are not
related to the use being made of the property, but instead are imposed
because the government conceives a way of shifting -the burden of
providing a government benefit to one not responsible for or only
remotely benefiting from the governments benefit.88 An arbitrarily
83. 113 Cal. App. 3d 491, 170 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1980).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 498, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 251.
86. Id. at 500, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 252-53.
87. Id. at 504, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 255. The court also found no deprivation of equal pro-
tection or substantive due process. Id. at 499, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 252.
88. Id. at 502, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 254.
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achieved exaction will be nullified as a disguised attempt to take private
property for public use without resort to eminent domain. 9
The second case deals with the regulation by the Commission of
improvements to a coastal industrial complex. In Georgia Pacific Corp.
v. California Coastal Commission,9" the Commission conditioned
development permits on the dedication of public access easements. 9'
As to a vertical access easement proposed by the Commission, the
court concluded that it coincided with the route then used by the
public for access to the coastline with Georgia Pacific's permission,
and was proper.92 As to a so-called "conditioned lateral access ease-
ment," the court held the Commission had abused its discretion, as
the easement requirement was based on speculation that Georgia-Pacific
might change the use of its land.93 Access conditions on the basis
of such speculation could, under the Commission's rationale, be
exacted of any permit applicant at any place and any time. The court,
however, held that the Commission's rationale was contrary to law.94
As to a third easement dedication requirement, one on a non-
contiguous parcel, the court found that no relationship existed be-
tween the site of the proposed easement and the construction pro-
ject. 95 The access conditions were imposed pursuant to the Public
Reserves Code,96 which requires a provision for public access to the
shoreline "in new development projects." 97 The court discussed this
as a limit on the Commission's power, stating:
The word "in" is subject to the provision of the Coastal Act re-
quiring that the enactment be liberally construed. (§30009, see also
CAL. CONST. art. X, §4.) Its ordinary meaning nevertheless requires
that it be interpreted to mean that access conditions imposed in a
permit for a "new development project" must bear some reasonable
relationship to the site of the project.98
To summarize the case law, the Commission (or the local authority
enforcing the Act) may constitutionally condition a coastal develop-
ment permit on a dedication of an easement for public coastal access
89. Id. at 503, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 254.
90. 132 Cal. App.3d 678, 183 Cal. Rptr. 395 (1982).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 699, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
93. Id. at 700, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
94. Id., 183 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
95. Id. at 701, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 408-09.
96. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §30212.
97. Id. (emphasis in original) (citing CAL. PuB. Ras. CODE §30212).
98. Id.
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in the interests of the general welfare. 99 This is because such condi-
tions are reasonably related to one of the principal objectives of the
Act, providing maximum public access. 0 Apparently, the courts feel
that a route historically used by the public is a particularly appropriate
location for a proposed easement dedication.' 0'
Such conditions for dedication are invalid, however, when they are
based on regulatory speculation about what the applicant might do
with its land in the future. 02 Further, such a requirement is invalid
when the access easement does not bear some reasonable relationship
to the site of the development project.'10 No authority exists for a
permit to be conditioned on the provision of free public parking until
5:00 p.m. daily even though providing parking is a legitimate con-
cern of government.' °0 Finally, such a condition may not be attached
to a permit for the reconstruction or improvement of a seawall when
either (1) the seawall has no adverse impact of the beach sand supply;
(2) the seawall does not interfere with natural shoreline processes;
or (3) evidence is lacking of an adverse effect on the access of the
public to or along the shore. 05
Other forms of dedication are possible in California, and a discus-
sion regarding them is applicable in part to dedications achieved
through the Coastal Act. The courts analyzing the constitutionality
of easement dedication conditions applied by the Commission rely
on the precedents relating to statutory dedication'0 6 and implied dedica-
tion. 107 The Commission also relies on the doctrine of implied dedica-
tion to determine the need for public access.' ° Pursuant to statute,
developers who subdivide may be required to dedicate land for specified
purposes as a condition to development. Furthermore, the common
law doctrine of implied dedication has been applied to create easements
in the public, when the proper elements can be found (usually con-
nected or associated with access to navigable waters). These two forms
of dedication will be examined in the following sections.
99. Id. at 699, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
100. Id., 183 Cal. Rptr. at 407-08.
101. Id., 183 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
102. Id. at 700, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
103. Id. at 701, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 409.
104. Liberty v. California Coastal Comm'n, 113 Cal. App. 3d 491, 504, 170 Cal. Rptr.
247, 255 (1980).
105. Pacific Legal Foundation, 33 Cal. 3d at 164, 655 P.2d at 309, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
106. Georgia Pacific, 132 Cal. App.3d at 699, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 408; Sea Ranch Ass'n,
527 F.Supp. 393-95 (1981); Remmenga v. California Coastal Comm'n, 163 Cal. App. 3d 623,
627-28, 209 Cal. Rptr. 628, 630-31 (1985) vacated as moot 454 U.S. 1070.
107. Grupe, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 170, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 592.
108. Id. at 158, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 583. See also supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
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OTHER FoRMs OF DEDICATION IN CALIFORNIA
A. Dedications Through the Subdivision Map Act
Pursuant to state statute, the governing body of a city or county
may require, as a condition to the approval of a final subdivision
map, the dedication of land, the payment of fees in lieu of land,
or a combination of both for park or recreational purposes.'0 9 This
statute and its predecessor ' 0 have been upheld against constitutional
challenges that they violate the "due process" and "taking without
just compensation" clauses of the United States and California Con-
stitutions."' When analyzing the constitutionality of the dedication
requirements of the Coastal Commission, the courts have relied heavily
on these precedents." 2
The legislative purpose of this dedication mechanism is to main-
tain and preserve open space for the recreational use of residents of
new subdivisions." 3 The California Supreme Court rejected the argu-
ment that a particular subdivision must create the need for such dedica-
tion."' The local government in requiring a dedication is not acting
under its powers of eminent domain. Rather, the developer who seeks
the advantage of subdivision has the duty to comply with reasonable
conditions for dedication." 5 The subdivider realizes a profit from
governmental approval of a subdivision since the land is made more
valuable by subdivision. In return for this benefit the city may re-
quire a dedication for park purposes. ' 6
One limit on this power is that of the "reasonableness" of the
dedication condition.' The constitutionality of the exaction does not
depend, however, on the exclusive use by subdivision residents." 8
The rationale behind these rules requiring the dedication of land
109. CAL. GOV'T CODE §66477.
110. 1965 Cal. Stat. c.1809, §2, at 4183 (enacting CAL Bus. & PROP. CODE §11546).
111. See Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek,
4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d. 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971). See also Trent Meredith, Inc. v. Oxnard,
114 Cal. App. 3d 317, 170 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1981).
112. See, e.g., Grupe, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 164-66, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 587-90.
113. Associated Home Builders, 4 Cal. 3d at 637, 484 P.2d at 609, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 633.
114. Id. at 638, 484 P.2d at 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
115. Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 42, 207 P.2d 1, 7 (1949).
116. Associated Home Builders, 4 Cal. 3d at 644, 484 P.2d at 615, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
117. Ayres, 34 Cal. 2d at 37, 207 P.2d at 5. Another limitation is that land or fees so
dedicated may not be diverted to any purpose other than park or recreational facilities which
will be available for use by the residents of the subdivision. Associated Home Builders, 4 Cal.
3d at 640 n.5, 484 P.2d at 612 n.5, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 636 n.5.
118. Associated Home Builders, 4 Cal. 3d at 640 n.5, 454 P.2d at 612 n.5, 94 Cal. Rptr.
at 636 n.5.
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or the payment of fees as a condition precedent to development is
that development is an act of a voluntary nature." 9 Even though the
development cannot proceed without regulatory approval, the developer
voluntarily decides whether to develop or not to develop.120 Develop-
ment is considered to be a privilege and not a right. 2 ' As long as
the dedications are reasonably related to health and welfare, the
exactions are likely to be upheld.'
22
The distinction between these statutory dedications applied to sub-
dividers and those applicable through the Coastal Act is that the
Coastal Act is applicable to all developers, whether the owner of a
lot for a single family or a major developer of residential or com-
mercial subdivision. The subdivider has the real possibility of earning
a profit on the subdivision, and the act of subdividing and develop-
ing creates a new and substantial burden on public resources. These
notions would also attach to a subdivider subject to regulatory dedica-
tion requirements under the Coastal Act. An owner of a lot suitable
solely for a single family home, however, will not be getting the same
benefits nor creating the same burdens. By developing, the owner of a
single family home gains new value, but not in the same sense of
"profit" envisioned by the developer. Secondly, by development on
a lot suitable for a single family home, normally only slight increased
burdens are placed on public resources, including public access to
navigable waters. Therefore, the precedents under the subdivision
dedication laws should not be applied indiscriminately to all planned
development projects under the Coastal Act.
B. Implied Dedication Doctrine
The Commission rationalizes many of its requirements for ease-
ment dedications on the doctrine of implied dedication.' 23 This doc-
trine gives rise to public prescriptive rights. In the Access Guidelines,
the Commission asserts that such rights must be protected wherever
they exist.' 24 According to the California Supreme Court, a common
law dedication of property to the public can be proved either by (1)
119. Trent, 114 Cal. App. 3d at 328, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 691.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Grupe, 166 Cal. App.3d at 158, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 583. The Commission in fact argues,
in response to the taking argument, that no property rights of the landowner are affected by
access conditions because an easement has already impliedly been dedicated to the public. Id.
124. Interpretative Guidelines, supra note 49, at 11.
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showing acquiescence of the owner in the use of land under cir-
cumstances which negate the idea that the use is under a license or
(2) establishing open and continuous use by the public for the prescrip-
tive period.' 5 When a litigant seeks to prove dedication by adverse
use, the question is whether the public has used the land for a period
of more than five years with full knowledge of the owner, without
asking or receiving permission to do so and without objection being
made by anyone. 2 If the land involved is a beach or shoreline area,
a showing must be made that the land was used as if the land were
a public recreation area. 27 Evidence that the public used the prop-
erty for the prescriptive period is sufficient to establish dedication. 28
Although use of the land as a beach or recreation area is certainly
public use of private property, does requiring dedication because of
the public use amount to an unconstitutional taking?
Analysis by the California Supreme Court of the constitutional limits
of the common law dedication doctrine has been rather terse, placing
most emphasis on Article X, Section 4, of the California Constitu-
tion, relating to public access to shoreline areas,2 9 and ignoring the
125. Union Transportation Co. v. Sacramento County, 42 Cal. 2d 235, 240-41, 267 P.2d
10, -13 f1954).
126. In determining the adverse use necessary to raise a conclusive presumption of dedica-
tion, analogies to the law of adverse possession and prescriptive easements can be misleading.
Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 39, 84 Cal. Rptr., 162, 168, 465 P.2d 50, 56 (1970).
In adverse possession and prescriptive easements, an individual is acting to gain a personal
property right and the test is whether he acted as if he claimed the legal right. Id. What must
be shown in common law dedication is that persons used the property, believing the public
had a right to such use. Union Transportation, 42 Cal. 2d at 240, 267 P.2d at 13; Gion, 2
Cal. 3d at 39, 465 P.2d at 56, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 168 (1970).
127. Gion, 2 Cal. 3d at 39, 465 P.2d at 56, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 168. The Gion case represents
two separate sets of facts, amounting to, according to the court, implied dedication. In one
situation, the parcel in question was located between the sea and the first parcel road, contain-
ing an old road bed and sea cliff. Id. at 34-36, 465 P.2d at 52-54, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 164-66.
The area had been mostly used by the public for access to the ocean. Id. The city over many
years had posted "cliff" warning signs, improved the property for parking, and maintained
trash receptacles. Id. The other case involved an unimproved dirt road which provided access
to an ocean beach. Id. at 36-38, 465 P.2d at 54-55, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 166-67. The public had
used the beach and the road in excess of 100 years. None of the previous owners had ever
objected to the use of the road by the public. Id.
128. Id. at 40-41, 465 P.2d at 57-58, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 169-70. A fee owner who seeks to
negate a finding of intent to dedicate based on uninterrupted public use for more than five
years must provide either that (1) The fee owner was granted a license in the public to use
the property or (2) the owner has made a bona fide attempt to prevent public use. Id. at
41, 465 P'2d at 57, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 169. The question of adversity of use is one of fact,
giving consideration to all the circumstances and references that may be drawn therefrom. Id.
at 40-41, 465 P.2d at 57, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 169. Another fact question is whether public use
of privately owned lands is under a license of the owner. Id. at 41, 465 P.2d at 57, 84 Cal.
Rptr. at 169. If the owner has not made significant attempts to halt public use, it will be
held as a matter of law that the owner intended to dedicate the property or an easement therein
to the public. Id., 465 P.2d at 58, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
129. Id. at 42-43, 465 P.2d at 58-59, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 170-71.
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United States Constitution. In Gion, the court declared:
Although article [X] section [4] may be limited to some extent
by the United States Constitution it clearly indicates that we should
encourage public use of shoreline areas whenever that can be done
consistently with the federal constitution.'30
This is the only discussion in the Gion decision of federal constitu-
tional rights for the protection of property rights. Certainly property
rights cannot be taken arbitrarily through state judicial process without
the provision of constitutional protection for the landowners involved.
Yet the court delineates none of the protections which are applicable.
Thus far, this article has shown how private property has been
dedicated to public use in California without the exercise of eminent
domain power. When dealing with property rights, rights generally
based on state law notions, the realm of federal constitutional law
becomes relevant and important, especially when private property is
being publicly used and not acquired through eminent domain.
Although the fact that property may be regulated is almost universally
accepted, the state courts do not seem to have appropriate sensitivity
to the protections of the United States Constitution. The following
sections explore how the United States Supreme Court has reviewed
challenges to governmental regulations that are alleged to take private
property. The discussion of the federal approach to available remedies
is highly relevant here in view of the rejection by California courts
of a money damage award for regulatory "takings."
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND
REGULATORY TAKING CASES
Despite recent state and United States Supreme Court decisions and
an abundance of scholarly commentary, the constitutional analysis
130. Id. at 43, 465 P.2d at 59, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 171. According to the court, once property
is dedicated to the public by adverse user for more than five years, nothing can be done by
the owner to take back what was previously private property. Id. at 45, 465 P.2d at 60, 84
Cal. Rptr. at 172. Subsequent to Gion, the legislature held a hearing on the subject in which
it was suggested that any taking by implied dedication is conceivably a compensable taking.
B. Reynolds, California Land Title Association, in Assembly Interim Committee on the Judiciary,
Hearing on Implied Dedication, Feb. 1977 in Lo. Angeles, p. 12. It is a great leap from pro-
viding reasonable beach access to the confiscation of private property. J. Fadem, in Assembly
Interim Committee on the Judiciary, Hearing on Implied Dedication, p. 19-20. When the par-
ticular governmental body affirmatively decides that additional recreational property is needed,
it should purchase the property. Id. at 23. The position of some government entities after
Gion, however, is that such land as it has been used by the public, even though in private
ownership, has only a nominal $I value. C. Turner, City Attorney for Long Beach, in Assembly
Interim Committee on the Judiciary, Hearing on Implied Dedication, p. 26. Whether proceeding
under eminent domain and paying $1 or suing for rights through the doctrine of implied dedica-
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of "regulatory takings" is in disarray.' 3 ' The term "regulatory takings"
encompasses a wide variety of regulations, ordinances, statutes, and
administrative actions of governmental entities, including land use and
zoning ordinances,' 3 environmental statutes,' 33 and regulation affec-
ting use of public streets.' 34 In these cases, the use restriction has
been promulgated pursuant to the government's police power.' 35 The
restrictions are challenged by private property owners, who claim the
effect of the restriction is so severe that the restriction is a "taking"
without just compensation.' 36
One of the earliest cases developing the doctrine that some land
use regulations may constitute a taking is Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon.' 3 An exercise of eminent domain results and compensation
must be made when a regulation reaches a certain magnitude in
restricting the use of property.'38 Justice Holmes said in Mahon:
The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated
to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized
as a taking."3 9
In subsequent cases, however, the court has upheld regulations which
greatly restrict the owner's use rights.' 0 The Court's most thorough
analysis of "takings" jurisprudence was in Penn Central Transporta-
tion Co. v. City of New York.'' The Court admitted its inability
tion, this would certainly appear to be the taking of property without just compensation. See
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). In Loretto, the Court
rejected the argument that a nominal $I fee to the property owner for a permanent physical
intrusion amounted to just compensation. Id. at 441. Either way, this is the severest penalty
possible to private property owners who have chosen not to develop their land, for whatever
reason. Id. at 435.
131. Kelso, Substantive Due Process As a Limit on Police Power Regulatory Takings, 20
WILLAM. ETTE L.J. 1 (1984).
132. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr.
372 (1979), aff'd 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
133. See, e.g., Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981).
134. See, e.g., San Leandro Rock Co. v. City of San Leandro, 136 Cal. App. 3d 25, 185
Cal. Rptr. 829 (1982).
135. Kelso, supra note 131, at 2.
136. Id.
137. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). The coal company had deeded surface rights to the plaintiff,
reserving the right to mine and disclaiming liability for injury as a result of mining. Id. at
412. The state legislature passed a statute prohibiting mining of coal if it caused subsidence
relative to a human habitation. Id. at 412-13. The plaintiff sought an injunction to prevent
the coal company from continuing its mining operations. Id. at 412.
138. Id. at 413.
139. Id. at 415.
140. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). The court held that
enforcement of an ordinance regulating the depth to which a gravel quarry could be excavated
did not constitute a taking even though the gravel company would be forced to close its quarry
as a consequence. Id. at 594-96.
141. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). (The court held that New York City's Landmarks Preservation
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to develop any "set formula" for determining when "justice and
fairness" require that economic injuries caused by governmental action
be compensated, rather than disproportionately remain concentrated
on a few persons.'"2 The court did however, establish the following
factors that should be considered in determining whether a police power
regulation effects a taking: (1) the character of the invasion; (2) the
diminution in the value of the affected property resulting from the
regulation; (3) the existence of reciprocal benefits to the affected party;
and (4) the extent to which the regulation interferes with investment
backed expectations. 41 3
The court has focused on the character of the invasion as the most
relevant factor when a physical invasion of private property exists,
as demonstrated in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp.'44
In Loretto, the Court held that a "permanent physical occupation
by the government is a taking without regard to the public interests
that it may serve."' 4 5 Most regulatory takings, however, fall into the
category of non-physical interference with propertyrights. 4 6 In addi-
tion to Kaiser Aetna v. United States,'4 7 a physical invasion "takings"
case, two non-physical "takings" cases handed down by the Supreme
Court are relevant: Agins v. City of Tiburon s'4  and San Diego Gas
& Electric Co. v. City of San Diego.'4 9 These latter two cases are
especially relevant in regard to the remedy available to a property
owner whose property has been taken through the regulatory power
of the government. In both cases the Court strongly suggests that
a damage remedy for regulatory taking is appropriate.'"
law, as applied to Grand Central Station, was not a taking in violation of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments. Id. at 137-38.
142. Id. at 124.
143. Id.
144. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). The government's action allowed the installation of fixtures and
cables on plaintiff's building for purposes of transmitting cable television signals. Id. at 423.
145. Id. at 426.
146. Kelso, supra note 131 at 9. The argument is made that non-physical regulatory "takings"
should be analyzed under substantive due process analysis to protect property owners against
excessive regulation. Id. at 14.
147. 444 U.S. 164 (1979). See infra notes 146-160 and accompanying text.
148. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
149. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
150. In Agins, the California Supreme Court held that a plaintiff could not recover damages
by suing for inverse condemnation based on the effect of a zoning ordinance on his property.
Agins, 447 U.S. at 258. The state court held that the sole remedies were declaratory relief
or mandamus. Id. at 259. In Agins, the plaintiff was not prohibited from all use, but was
limited to building one to five dwellings on the five acre parcel. Id. at 271. The state court
was concerned that the availability of a damage remedy challenging zoning or land use regula-
tions would restrict the flexibility of local government in dealing with urban growth problems.
Id. at 276. The United States Supreme Court affirmed, but only on the rationale that the
plaintiff still had the ability to use the property for his intended purposes (residential), thus
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Perhaps the most significant case of the United States Supreme Court
relevant to regulatory "takings" as effected by development dedica-
tion conditions is Kaiser Aetna v. United States.'"' The next section
will explore the reasoning of the Court in that case and the interplay
between police power and the constitutional mandate of just
compensation.
Kaiser Aetna is most relevant to the issue under discussion in that
the government was attempting in Kaiser to invoke a public easement
over private property. The attempt to exercise the police power in
this way was sought to be justified on policy grounds similar to those
used by the California Coastal Commission, i.e., to protect the public's
right of access to navigable waters.
In Kaiser Aetna, the United States Supreme Court undertook to
resolve the question of whether a private property owner, who volun-
tarily develops land and thereby changes the character of the prop-
erty so that activities there may be regulated under the government's
police power, can be forced to give to the public a perpetual ease-
ment. ' The Court held that if the government wanted to transform
private property into a public aquatic park after the owner had pro-
there was no taking. Id. at 259. "Because no taking has occurred, we need not consider whether
a state may limit the remedits available to a person whose land has been taken without just
compensation." Id. at 263. Similarly, a ruling on the proper remedy was foreclosed in San
Diego Gas & Electric case due to the peculiar procedural stance of the proceeding. San Diego
Gas & Electric, 450 U.S. at 623. In the San Diego Gas & Electric case, the utility had acquired
a 412-acre parcel for a future power plant. Id. The city took three actions which affected the
utility's 'land: (1) downzoned a portion from industrial to agriculture; (2) adopted an open-
space plan identifying the utility's parcel as "open-space"; and (3) proposed a bond issue to
obtain funds to acquire open-space land, including that of the utility. Id. at 624-25. The utility
filed suit claiming the city had taken its property. without just compensation, in violation of
the California and United States Constitutions. Id. at 625-26. The utility was awarded a judg-
ment for $3,000,000 which was affirmed by the court of appeal. Id. at 627-28. Upon appeal
to the California Supreme Court, that court remanded it to the Court of Appeal for
reconsideration in the light of its decision in Agins. Id. at 628. Upon review, the Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court and denied any other relief, basing its decision on Agins. Id.
at 629-30. In a split decision, a majority of the United States Supreme Court concluded that
because the trial court's decision was reversed, there was no finding of a taking, and thus
no final judgment from which to review the legal issue of just compensation for regulatory
takings. Id. at 633. The interesting aspect of the court's handling of the case is that a majority
of the members of the court were apparently of the view that money damages was the ap-
propriate remedy in regulatory "takings" cases. Id. at 633, 658-61. This majority of justices
included concurring Justice Rehnquist, who agreed with the court's opinion, that there had
been no final judgment from which appeal to the court was proper. Id. at 633. Dissenting
Justice Brennan, with whom Justices Stewart, Marshall and Powell joined, concluded that the
California court's approach ignored the United State's Supreme Court precedents on the availabili-
ty of a damage remedy when the government's police power works to effect a taking. Id.
at 658-61.
151. Kaiser Aetna v. United States 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
152. Id. at 170.
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ceeded as far as it had, the government could not require free public
access without invoking its eminent domain power and paying just
compensation."3
In Kaiser, the developers of a marina subdivision had connected
a shallow pond to the adjacent bay through a natural beach sand
barrier. They were advised by the United States Army Corps of
Engineers (COE) that permits were not required for development and
operation within the pond. The developers made further improvements
that included deepening the channel, constructing vast marina facilities,
and developing a marina shopping center.
In 1972, a dispute arose between the developers and the COE con-
cerning (1) whether the developer was subject to future permitting
authority of the COE, pursuant to section 10 of the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1899,' 54 for subsequent construction, excavation or
filling in the marina; and (2) whether the developer could prevent
public access to the marina.' 55 The COE contended that as a result
of the developer's improvements, the pond, now connected with other
navigable waters, had become a navigable water of the United States
and subject to federal police power authority.'56 Justice Rehnquist
framed the issue for the Court as follows:
[W]hether . . . petitioners' improvements to Kuapa Pond caused
its original character to be so altered that it became subject to an
overriding federal navigational servitude, thus converting into a public
aquatic park that which petitioners had invested millions of dollars
in improving on the assumption that it was a privately owned pond
leased to them.'5 7
The developer did not challenge the lower court's holding that the
marina was within the scope of the regulatory power of Congress
and, therefore, subject to regulation by the COE pursuant to its
authority under section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act. The United
States argued that since the federal government had regulatory power
over "navigable waters of the United States," the public thereby
acquired a right to use the pond as a continuous highway for naviga-
tion, and that the COE could obtain an injunction to force the
developers to allow public access. '
153. Id. at 180.
154. 33 U.S.C. §403.
155. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 168.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 169.
158. Id. at 170.
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The Court said, however, that by being forced to allow public access,
the developer would have ". . . somehow lost one of its most essen-
tial sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized
as property - the right to exclude others."'5 9 When the government
wishes to acquire dry lands, the government is required by the Emi-
nent Domain Clause of the fifth amendment to condemn and pay
fair value for that interest.' 0 The attempt by the government to create
a public right of access to the improved pond went so far beyond
ordinary regulation or improvement for navigation as to amount to
a taking under the logic of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 6 1 This
is not a case in which the government is exercising its regulatory power
causing only an insubstantial devaluation of private property; rather,
the government is imposing a navigational servitude amounting to an
actual physical invasion of the privately owned marina.' 2
The United States Supreme Court held that the "right to exclude,"
a fundamental element of the property right, falls within the category
of interests that the government cannot take without compensation. 63
Even if the government physically invades only an easement in prop-
erty, just compensation must be paid.' 6 In discussing the overlapping
of use of the government's police and eminent domain power, the
Court concluded:
Thus, if the Government wishes to make what was formerly Kuapa
Pond into a public aquatic park after petitioners have proceeded
as far as they have here, it may not, without invoking its eminent
domain power and paying just compensation, require them to allow
free access to the dredged pond while petitioners' agreement with
their customers calls for an annual $72 regular fee."51
One important distinction in the constitutional analysis of regulatory
"takings" is whether a physical invasion exists. Restricting the use
of property for the purpose of the public's interest in land use or
aesthetics, as in Penn Central without creating any possessory or use
rights in the public may be distinguished from a case in which the
government seeks to create a use right in the general public or for
a particular individual, causing physical invasion to occur. The right
159. Id. at 176.
160. Id. at 177.
161. Id. at 178; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
162. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 180.
163. Id. at 179-80.
164. Id. at 180.
165. Id.
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to exclude has been lost in the latter case, and this right is fundamental
to our notion of property.
The section that follows attempts to apply the analysis of the United
States Supreme Court to the Commission's requirement of easement
dedications from development applicants. Although the Kaiser Aetna
situation is not completely analogous, the analysis of the relationship
between police power regulation, private property and the federal con-
stitution is relevant. Three distinct factual circumstances will be
analyzed according to the Kaiser Aetna rationale.
TI APPLICATION OF SUPREmE COURT PRECEDENTS
TO EXAMPLES OF COMMfISSION ACTIONS
A. Whaler's Village Homeowners
In California Coastal Commission v. Whaler's Village Homeowners
Association, certain homeowners built single family residences on
beach-front property prior to enactment of the Coastal Act. 66 Their
property extended to the mean high tide line. 6 ' The homes were con-
structed on concrete slabs, anchored on the sea-facing portion by ce-
ment caissons sunk to a depth of twelve feet." In 1978, high-storm
seas and high tides washed out the supporting ground and sand from
beneath their homes. 69 Immediate action was necessary to save the
homes, and rocks were placed to provide support and to allow beach
sand to be trapped in and behind the rocks.' 70
Shortly thereafter, the homeowners applied to the Regional Coastal
Commission for a permit to make the rock protection permanent.' 7'
The Commission staff approved the permit, but with a condition that
the homeowners irrevocably deed to the state their entire privately
owned beach area, calling it a "grant of an easement for public access
and passive recreational use." '1'7  The homeowners withdrew their
application.
Subsequently, more severe storms were experienced and as an
166. California Coastal Commission v. Whalers' Village Homeowners Association, State-
ment of Intended Decision, Case No. SP50494, Superior Court for the County of Ventura,
at 2. This example is quite similar to that of the Baileys. See supra notes 8 and 9 and accom-
panying text. See also Pacific Legal Foundation, 33 Cal. 3d 158, 655 P.2d 306, 188 Cal. Rptr. 104.
167. Whalers' Village, Case No. SP50494, Superior Court for the County of Ventura, at 2.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 3.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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emergency measure additional rocks were placed under and on the
other rocks.' 73 The Coastal Commission notified the homeowners that
placing these rocks constituted a "new development" under the Coastal
Act and either a permit would be required or the rocks would have
to be removed.' 74 The homeowners applied for a permit, which was
approved but with the same condition for an easement dedication as
described earlier. The court granted the homeowners a writ of man-
date invalidating the condition, stating:
[The condition requiring the petitioners to deed their entire private
beach to the State or lose their homes to the sea constitutes an
unlawful taking of private property without justification or the pay-
ment of just compensation. "'
The effect of the Commission's condition would have been similar
to the proposal of the government in KaiserAetna v. United States
i.e., the exaction of an easement because of the location of the develop-
ment, coupled with protection of the public policy of access to
navigable waters. 7 6 Governmental power to assure the public a free
right of access to navigable waters, however, does not answer the
question of whether a particular statute or regulatory action amounts
to a taking.'77 Like the pervasive nature of congressional regulation
of national waters, the State of California has the authority to oversee
an orderly process of planning for the future development of its
coastline. 78 Among the factors to be utilized to examine the "takings"
question are (1) economic impact of the regulation (2) its interference
with investment backed expectations and (3) the character of the
governmental action.' 7
With respect to the character of the governmental action, an im-
portant inquiry is the public policy being served."' In Kaiser Aetna,
the policy behind the navigational servitude was protection of the flow
of interstate waters and the commerce thereon."' In the Coastal Act,
the public policy being served is protection of the public's right of
173. Id.
174. Id. at 4.
175. Id. at 6. Note that this, along with declaratory relief, is the only relief available for
these violations according to the California Supreme Court. Agins, 24 Cal. 3d at 278, 598
P.2d at 32, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
176. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. 164, 171-73.
177. Id. at 174.
178. Pacific Legal Foundation, 33 Cal. 3d at 162, 655 P.2d at 308, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
179. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 175.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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access to navigable waters for essentially the same public trust uses
as that of the federal navigational sevitude.'8 2 In both situations, private
property owners contiguous to a navigable body of water have in-
vested substantial amounts of money in purchasing the land and
making improvements." 3 In both cases the government contends that
as a result of the present or proposed improvements the owner should
somehow lose one of the most essential parts of the property right
- the right to exclude others."84
The federal navigational servitude, as derived from the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution, gives rise to an authority
in the federal government to assure that navigable waters retain their
capacity for navigation.' 5 Likewise, the state has the duty to protect
the public's right to access to navigable waters.' 6 In both cases,
however, the government's attempt to create a public right of access
over private property may go so far beyond ordinary regulation as
to amount to a taking under the logic of Pennsylvania Coal v.
Mahon. 18 7
The imposition of a public easement results in an actual physical
invasion of privately owned land.' 8 Even if the government physical-
ly invades only an easement in property, it must nonetheless pay just
compensation.'8 9 Thus, whether the government wants either to create
a public aquatic park or a public beach or accessway thereto, it may
not do so unless it invokes its eminent domain power and pays just
compensation.' 90 In the following section, the analysis is applied to
a different factual situation, the large project developer.
B. The Hypothetical Condominium Developer
Unlike the individual home owner at Whaler's Cove, a condominium
developer creates different impacts and implicates other interests of
the state. A condominium development generally takes a large tract
of land, and, if seaward of the first paved road, creates potential
aesthetic and natural resource impact problems. A large development
182. CAL. CONST. art. X, §4.
183. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176.
184. Id. at 176. See also Georgia-Pacific, 133 Cal. App.3d at 699, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 407-08.
185. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 177.
186. See CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §30210.
187. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 178.
188. Id. at 180.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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is more likely to adversely affect access to the shoreline.'91 This type
of development is similar to that regulated by the Subdivision Map
Act discussed above, and it usually entails great potential for profit
and creates the potential of a major impact on many public
resources.' 9 How, if at all, can this situation be distinguished from
Kaiser Aetna?
One distinction is that in Kaiser Aetna, in reliance on the assertion
of the Corps of Engineers of lack of regulatory jurisdiction, the
developer expended substantial sums in creating the marina. 191
Although such representations may not amount to estoppel, they may
justifiably lead to reasonable expectations embodied in the concept
of property. 194 The Kaiser Aetna court noted that the government
could probably have initially prohibited the marina development due
to impairment of navigation, or have conditioned approval on com-
pliance with measures for the promotion of navigation.'19
The coastal condominium developer is in a different position from
that of Kaiser Aetna in that its only financial outlay has been for land
and initial preparation. Secondly, there is no reasonable reliance on
representations regarding non-regulation by the Commission. The
developer voluntarily proceeds with the full realization of the potential
regulatory constraints.' 96 Reasonable conditions for public access to
shoreline on a permit to build condominiums appear justified because
of a reasonable relationship to the public interests being served. Where
does the owner of a single lot who wishes to build a single family home
fit into the picture?
C. Building the Family Home on the Coast
Agins has demonstrated that no taking occurs when.a beneficial use
remains after government regulation.' 97 The Commission or its local
counterpart certainly has the regulatory power to establish reasonable
limitations on land use. But does that power extend to requiring an ease-
191. In many ways, due to the land size and proximity to the shore, this type of develop-
ment is analogous to that involved in Georgia-Pacific, 133 Cal. App.3d at 683-84, 183 Cal.
Rptr. at 397-98.
192. See supra notes 103-17, and accompanying text.
193. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 167.
194. Id. at 179.
195. Id.
196. See Pacific Legal Foundation, 33 Cal. 3d at 172-74, 655 P.2d at 315-16, 188 Cal. Rptr.
at 171-73.
197. Agins, 337 U.S. 255.
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ment for public access before getting a development permit? As with
the hypothetical condominium builder, there is no reliance on the govern-
ment's representation of non-regulation. In the usual circumstance,
however, there is no similar profit potential or impact on public resources
exists. The condominium developer is building on the speculation of
making money on the development. The party seeking to build a single
family home is usually investing substantial sums for the development.
Investment in the land alone certainly carries with it an "investment-
backed expectation." In the usual case, a single family home developer
should not be forced to give up land to the state, because his impact
on public access is negligible. For instance, the landowner in Grupe had
no intention of interfering with the public's right to walk along the
shoreline.' 98 The landowner's complaint is that there is no public right,
constitutional or otherwise, to passive or active recreation on the private
property of others. The right guaranteed by the California Constitution
is the right of access to navigable waters. This is clearly an admirable
right, but like any right should not be exercised to the severe detriment
of the rights of others. By building his home, a single family home
developer simply has not affected the public right of access. When the
Commission seeks to exercise its police power in such an expansive way,
claiming to serve public constitutional ights, it is in effect violating fun-
damental rights of the private property owner, the rights to peaceful en-
joyment and to exclude others.
Such an owner should not be required to give up constitutional rights
for the mere privilege of building a home near state tidelands. This may
not be true, of course, if the single family home constitutes a palacial
estate. In the latter case, due to the increased likelihood of impact on
public access, an easement dedication as a condition to development may
be appropriate.
CONCLUSION
As previously shown, when a government restricts the use of land under
regulatory action, a taking may result which requires just compensation.
This is especially so when the regulation causes a physical invasion of
private property. California's regulatory scheme for coastal development
has been applied in some instances in ways which result in such a taking.
As a condition to obtaining a development permit, landowners frequently
198. Grupe, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 148, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
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have been forced to give an easement of valuable property to the govern-
ment. In some circumstances, the effect and impact of development may
justify such a dedication. In other cases, it amounts to a taking and trig-
gers the constitutional requirement of just compensation.
